"That's a Hell of a price to Pay for Being Stylish"

Clint Eastwood's hardened cop Dirty Harry pointed out a universal truth when he expressed grave doubts about promoting less than qualified female police officers because of political correctness.  The Pentagon's recent decision is along these lines because some women in the military as well as activist groups have been pressuring it to get on board with the politically correct notion of promoting women even though they lack a common requirement: combat experience.  Now two things seem to be happening; one is a broadening of the definition of combat experience and allowing women to serve below the battalion level so they will be closer to "the front."

Women have been combat pilots since the Clinton administration, but for now common sense among the service chiefs continues to keep women from serving in combat units such as infantry, armor and Special Forces.  There may be a change coming to artillery branch, but more research is needed.  Millions of women have served with distinction in a number of critical roles, including roles that brought them directly into harm's way, but this is not really a reason to up end what remains of our most effective units.  I understand that women feel they have been short-changed sometimes with promotions, but like every other person in the military, they have to understand that the good of the service comes before personal considerations.

Can You Hear the Thunder?

Another round of budget cuts is being pushed forward by the Obama administration and there is a new push to drop the venerable A-10 Thunderbolt.  The Air Force has being trying to get rid of the ugly, slow ground attack plane.  However, up to now it has survived the fire partly because it is beloved by the Army and Marines who are the actual beneficiaries of the A-10s' effectiveness.  it is not glamorous and sleek like the F-22 or B-2, but does anyone want to argue that those planes have played a more important role over the last ten years or are likely to in the next ten years?

It should not be a matter of choosing one over the other; the truth is we need F-22s, A-10s, B-2s, C-17s and C-130s as well as a host of helicopters and UAVs.  The Air Force's historical and institutional prejudice toward strategic bombers and strike aircraft is both understandable and unacceptable giving the evidence of the last 50 years that the Air Force has been needed much more as a surveillance, cargo and ground attack component of the military than as either as a bomber force or in air to air combat.

All of the talk of jointness notwithstanding, too much separation been allowed between the Army and Air Force which probably started even before the two were formally separated in 1947.  Politicians can pretend the GWOT is going away and that the horrific budget deficit can be balanced on the back of the Pentagon, but even a glance at the Federal budget should be enough to convince one that wiping out the Pentagon would not put much of a bite in the leviathan of debt medicare and the other unsustainable entitlements represent.

Rumsfeld Rules! Part II

When Mr. Rumsfeld took over at the Pentagon in 2001  he had a mandate from President Bush to begin to transform the military from the Cold War force it had remained even as it had shrunk by about half during the 1990's.  Officials in the Obama administration have tried to characterize the recent plans for massive budget cuts to military spending as somehow a continuation of the Bush/Rumsfeld transformation.  However, this clearly wrong since one of the first things Mr. Rumsfeld did was request a sizable increase in funding.  In the spring and summer of 2001 most congressmen were not eager to act on this, but of course that changed after 9/11.

Significant increases were approved by congress; there was enough money to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq and offer assistance in the Philippines and the Horn of Africa, but there was no big defense buildup as was seen under President Reagan in the 1980s.  Equipment and personnel were replaced but there was not significant beefing up of forces.  For example, Rumsfeld's successor Secretary Gates cut back production on the F-22 and Secretary Panetta has recently slowed production of the the F-35.  Everyone complained about not having enough troops to fight the GWOT, but the Bush administration never made a big push to increase the ranks and the Obama administration wants to actually reduce the Army and Marine Corps.

The Obama policy might be cynically summarized as an attempt to weaken the military to the point that it is no longer a question of should we engage an enemy like Iran?, but can we? A  smaller military with aging equipment will be seen as less and less capable of mounting effective offensive operations.  The administration insists the force will not be hollowed out but what will we have in five or ten years when we have not begun to make serious spending commitments for new weapons like next generation tanks, attack helicopters and long range bombers?  What about a replacement for the M4/M16 that offers more firepower?  Is all of this going to be left in limbo until drones are deployed to replace most of the manned systems?  Rumsfeld's Pentagon unveiled an ambitious program of next generation upgrades and weapons procurements, but these were mostly canceled by the Obama administration.  The legacy of Defense Secretary Panetta remains to be seen but it does but it does not appear to be one of a resurgent and reinvigorated military, it feels like it will be more like the apathy of the 1970s.

Rumsfeld Rules! Part I

Mr. Rumsfeld's memoir "Known and Unknown" is a fascinating book stretching from his childhood during the dark days of World War Two through his time as Secretary of Defense during the Global War on Terror.  Many people may know him through his time as something of a media darling during the early months of Operation Enduring Freedom when he gave entertaining performances at Pentagon press conferences.  Of course what the media gives it takes away and with the incidents surrounding the Iraqi prison at Abu Graib he became the embodiment of everything that was supposedly wrong with the Bush administration in general and the prosecution of the war in particular.

Mr. Rumsfeld had made enemies at the Pentagon however, long before he made enemies in the press.  His straight forward, probing manner could be abrasive to some, but the real problem many in the senior military had with him is that he tried to end business as usual.  The relative calm of the 1990's had resulted in a peace time, increasingly politically correct military content to ride the post Cold War wave into the 21st century without seriously reconsidering its own state of affairs.  When President Bush directed Secretary Rumsfeld to conduct reviews in anticipation of his policy of transformation the brass began to resist.

Six Kinds of Camouflage: Why the Pentagon Needs to be Fixed/Synopsis

The Pentagon has been at the epicenter of the war against militant Islamism since the morning of September 11, 2001.  It also finds itself in the middle of an ongoing and evolving “transformation.”  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld opened the Office of Force Transformation at the Pentagon in October 2001.  However, as the first term of the Bush administration began to take shape in early 2001 the Pentagon thought it would have years of relative peace and quiet to implement its long-term plans for transforming the U.S. military.  Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom and smaller operations around the world have both interrupted and instigated various aspects of the ongoing program. 

The program can be broken down into three major divisions: bureaucratic reform, technological improvements and evolutions in doctrine, strategy and tactics.  The biggest obstacle that stands in the way of a truly transformed military is not the war on terror or funding shortfalls but the mindset of many of the Pentagon’s leaders.  We can call this bureaucratic, institutionalized and sometimes narrow way of thinking “Pentagonism.”  Just one small example of this is the infighting between the Army and Air Force over allocation and operational control of the limited number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs.)  The competition for these platforms underscores another problem within the Pentagon culture that has trickled down to some extent at least into the officer corps and enlisted ranks. 

Technology is widely seen as a, if not the indispensable factor that separates us from our enemies and ensures victory over their less sophisticated ways.  You see this mentality in the constant requests for more UAVs, more close air support of ground units, more stand off munitions and more networked computer systems.  The UAVs are a wonderful piece of technology that have saved many American lives and ended many enemy lives, but the constant clamor for more and better ones could serve to undermine the overall tactical savvy of combat units on the ground.  An over reliance on them could evoke a mindset and then a doctrine that says we need UAV support to conduct our mission.  This position would be self-limiting and ultimately self-defeating.  American soldiers in World War Two were well aware that their Sherman tanks were grossly inferior to the German Panzers, but superior numbers of Sherman’s and old-fashioned perseverance carried the day.  The U.S. military should not put itself in the position of relying on superior technology in inferior numbers as the Nazi’s did.

In the end technology or more generally raw military power is ultimately not the way the U.S. military will defeat militant Islamism.  It will have to be done by brave, tough and well-trained warriors.  Americans have not successfully confronted this issue since it was the overwhelming underdog in the Revolutionary War more than 230 years ago.  Since its war with British Empire it has tended to rely on overwhelming firepower to win, but as the Vietnam War demonstrated, this was not always a successful doctrine.  It is one of the founding principles of the Army Special Forces that people are more valuable than technology. 

 

Small Arms: Big Pain

The U.S. military has been engaged in Afghanistan for ten years and for eight years in Iraq. It seems to be a little late in the game for the Army and Marine Corps to still be working through issues with their rifles and other small arms.  I do not want to hear any excuses about lack of money - both services field multi-million dollar weapons systems from UAVs to tanks, helicopters and planes.  But Somehow the infantry's small arms, in this case grenade launchers, continue to get short shrift.

The Army is field testing the XM25, a dedicated grenade launcher the fires a programmable 25mm airburst round.  The Marines say it is too expensive for them to replace their 40mm rifle-slung grenade launchers with.  Why isn't the XM25 a joint program with Army and Marines?  Why is the XM25 using 25mm rounds when Marines and others believe the 40mm round would be better?  An infantry weapons officer with the Marines said,"if you have an air-burst capability on a multi-shot grenade launcher, you would be wrecking people."  Shouldn't every infantry platoon, Army and Marines, have at least one such weapon by now?

  Perhaps if the Corps finally admitted its traditionally amphibious assault role is behind them, they could free up their budget for things like a multi-shot grenade launcher with airburst rounds. Amphibious assault vehicles, hovercrafts and assault ships that carry them are expensive to build and field.  The Marines of the 21st century  launch assaults via troop transport helicopter and tilt rotors.  These could be launched from modified carriers instead of separate ships.  Storming the beaches died with the proliferation of cruise missiles and tactical rocket batteries. It is time Marine Corps doctrine, organization, training and procurement should reflect this.

Obama's Vietnam

President Obama did not initiate Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 2003 invasion that toppled the Baathist regime and led to Saddam Hussein's capture.  However, when Obama became commander in chief he inherited OEF and the serious national security issues that go along with that.  Iraq has made considerable progress from the days when it was ruled as a brutal police state.  Like Japan, Germany and South Korea, where the United States has maintained large numbers of troops for decades to promote regional stability, Iraq is in need of a continued U.S. presence to help prevent Shiite and Sunni factions from dragging the country into civil war and discourage Iran from spreading its influence even further.

To put it bluntly, U.S. national security interests are more important than Obama's campaign promises or his desire for a second term.  More than 4,400 American lives were lost, many thousands more seriously wounded and about a trillion dollars was spent to ensure victory.  Too much has been sacrificed in the Global War on Terror (overseas contingency operations) to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory for the sake of one man's political fortunes.