Rumsfeld Rules! Part I

Mr. Rumsfeld's memoir "Known and Unknown" is a fascinating book stretching from his childhood during the dark days of World War Two through his time as Secretary of Defense during the Global War on Terror.  Many people may know him through his time as something of a media darling during the early months of Operation Enduring Freedom when he gave entertaining performances at Pentagon press conferences.  Of course what the media gives it takes away and with the incidents surrounding the Iraqi prison at Abu Graib he became the embodiment of everything that was supposedly wrong with the Bush administration in general and the prosecution of the war in particular.

Mr. Rumsfeld had made enemies at the Pentagon however, long before he made enemies in the press.  His straight forward, probing manner could be abrasive to some, but the real problem many in the senior military had with him is that he tried to end business as usual.  The relative calm of the 1990's had resulted in a peace time, increasingly politically correct military content to ride the post Cold War wave into the 21st century without seriously reconsidering its own state of affairs.  When President Bush directed Secretary Rumsfeld to conduct reviews in anticipation of his policy of transformation the brass began to resist.

Six Kinds of Camouflage: Why the Pentagon Needs to be Fixed/Synopsis

The Pentagon has been at the epicenter of the war against militant Islamism since the morning of September 11, 2001.  It also finds itself in the middle of an ongoing and evolving “transformation.”  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld opened the Office of Force Transformation at the Pentagon in October 2001.  However, as the first term of the Bush administration began to take shape in early 2001 the Pentagon thought it would have years of relative peace and quiet to implement its long-term plans for transforming the U.S. military.  Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom and smaller operations around the world have both interrupted and instigated various aspects of the ongoing program. 

The program can be broken down into three major divisions: bureaucratic reform, technological improvements and evolutions in doctrine, strategy and tactics.  The biggest obstacle that stands in the way of a truly transformed military is not the war on terror or funding shortfalls but the mindset of many of the Pentagon’s leaders.  We can call this bureaucratic, institutionalized and sometimes narrow way of thinking “Pentagonism.”  Just one small example of this is the infighting between the Army and Air Force over allocation and operational control of the limited number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs.)  The competition for these platforms underscores another problem within the Pentagon culture that has trickled down to some extent at least into the officer corps and enlisted ranks. 

Technology is widely seen as a, if not the indispensable factor that separates us from our enemies and ensures victory over their less sophisticated ways.  You see this mentality in the constant requests for more UAVs, more close air support of ground units, more stand off munitions and more networked computer systems.  The UAVs are a wonderful piece of technology that have saved many American lives and ended many enemy lives, but the constant clamor for more and better ones could serve to undermine the overall tactical savvy of combat units on the ground.  An over reliance on them could evoke a mindset and then a doctrine that says we need UAV support to conduct our mission.  This position would be self-limiting and ultimately self-defeating.  American soldiers in World War Two were well aware that their Sherman tanks were grossly inferior to the German Panzers, but superior numbers of Sherman’s and old-fashioned perseverance carried the day.  The U.S. military should not put itself in the position of relying on superior technology in inferior numbers as the Nazi’s did.

In the end technology or more generally raw military power is ultimately not the way the U.S. military will defeat militant Islamism.  It will have to be done by brave, tough and well-trained warriors.  Americans have not successfully confronted this issue since it was the overwhelming underdog in the Revolutionary War more than 230 years ago.  Since its war with British Empire it has tended to rely on overwhelming firepower to win, but as the Vietnam War demonstrated, this was not always a successful doctrine.  It is one of the founding principles of the Army Special Forces that people are more valuable than technology. 

 

Small Arms: Big Pain

The U.S. military has been engaged in Afghanistan for ten years and for eight years in Iraq. It seems to be a little late in the game for the Army and Marine Corps to still be working through issues with their rifles and other small arms.  I do not want to hear any excuses about lack of money - both services field multi-million dollar weapons systems from UAVs to tanks, helicopters and planes.  But Somehow the infantry's small arms, in this case grenade launchers, continue to get short shrift.

The Army is field testing the XM25, a dedicated grenade launcher the fires a programmable 25mm airburst round.  The Marines say it is too expensive for them to replace their 40mm rifle-slung grenade launchers with.  Why isn't the XM25 a joint program with Army and Marines?  Why is the XM25 using 25mm rounds when Marines and others believe the 40mm round would be better?  An infantry weapons officer with the Marines said,"if you have an air-burst capability on a multi-shot grenade launcher, you would be wrecking people."  Shouldn't every infantry platoon, Army and Marines, have at least one such weapon by now?

  Perhaps if the Corps finally admitted its traditionally amphibious assault role is behind them, they could free up their budget for things like a multi-shot grenade launcher with airburst rounds. Amphibious assault vehicles, hovercrafts and assault ships that carry them are expensive to build and field.  The Marines of the 21st century  launch assaults via troop transport helicopter and tilt rotors.  These could be launched from modified carriers instead of separate ships.  Storming the beaches died with the proliferation of cruise missiles and tactical rocket batteries. It is time Marine Corps doctrine, organization, training and procurement should reflect this.

Obama's Vietnam

President Obama did not initiate Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 2003 invasion that toppled the Baathist regime and led to Saddam Hussein's capture.  However, when Obama became commander in chief he inherited OEF and the serious national security issues that go along with that.  Iraq has made considerable progress from the days when it was ruled as a brutal police state.  Like Japan, Germany and South Korea, where the United States has maintained large numbers of troops for decades to promote regional stability, Iraq is in need of a continued U.S. presence to help prevent Shiite and Sunni factions from dragging the country into civil war and discourage Iran from spreading its influence even further.

To put it bluntly, U.S. national security interests are more important than Obama's campaign promises or his desire for a second term.  More than 4,400 American lives were lost, many thousands more seriously wounded and about a trillion dollars was spent to ensure victory.  Too much has been sacrificed in the Global War on Terror (overseas contingency operations) to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory for the sake of one man's political fortunes.

Giving Away the Store

Has America's involvement in Iraq been called on account of the 2012 presidential election?  With the status of force agreement with Iraq expiring, the Obama administration failed to negotiate a deal to allow at least several thousand combat troops in the country beyond the end of this year.  A cynical person might argue the administration allowed the negotiations to fail because it wanted out so it could report a full pull-out to its base.  Reelection politics cannot drive national security policy in general and strategic decisions regarding the War on Terror in particular.

The left has consistently complained that Operation Iraqi Freedom was another Vietnam, but ironically it is a leftist president who risks turning a hard fought, bloody victory into a defeat.  if a weak Iraq is torn apart or manipulated and exploited by an ascendent Iran for its own purposes than President Obama will have abandoned the thousands of troops killed and wounded to secure victory and  delivered another Vietnam.

The New Project

"Six Kinds of Camouflage: Why the Pentagon Needs to be Fixed." This is the working title of the book I am working on.  It had its beginnings in the "Transformation" chapter of my book, "A Short History of the Long War."  Two key themes will be consolidation and generalization in the face of too much separateness and specialization among and between the services.  With the expected budget cuts and reductions in force levels over the next decade more will truly have to be done with less.

Chapters will cover topics like:

teeth to tail ratio
plan 1945
growing gap between trigger pullers and point and clickers
people versus technology
unit reorganization
privatizing the VA

You're in the Army Now...For Now

A recent news report revealed that the U.S. Army plans to cut its force levels by 50,000 over the next five years. Does anyone at the pentagon believe the Army is currently overstaffed after hearing for years that it was stretched to the breaking point? No this is not about too may troops it is about too few dollars chasing too many new technologies.  In the coming era of financial austerity something will have to give and our military leaders have decided to invest in big ticket weapon platforms like the next generation long range bomber at the expense of infantry battalions.  Why bother developing and fielding a new and improved rifle if you are going to whittle down the number of soldiers and Marines anyway?

I grew up during the Cold War when the military was always looking for "a few good men" and trying to get you to "be all you can be." Within the next twenty years there will come a time when the prevailing line could be "don't call us, we'll call you" as interested young men and women compete for limited slots akin to joining the FBI or getting into a prestigious school.  Think about how small the Army will be when a single armored and heavily armed soldier can replace an infantry platoon or company. Most of the slots available will be for technicians to repair the "Starship Trooper" suits and drone operators and still more technicians - assuming the technicians are not mostly private contractors from the firms that developed the weapons.