Mr. Peters is an effective writer with a lot to say and a lot of it is dead on, but some of it comes off like he just wants to win the argument. Case in point: he repeatedly blasts the Bush administration for incompetence and ineptitude for how it waged war and peace in Iraq between 2003 and 2007 before the "surge" was implemented. As a student of history he cites many historical examples such as the invasion of Normandy in which more than two thousand soldiers were killed on the beach. Was General Eisenhower and his generals incompetent? Was their plan inept? or did they encounter heavier resistance and helplessly watch little mishaps pile up at the water's edge along with the bodies?
Obviously mistakes and missteps piled up in Iraq too - one I agree whole heartedly with Peter's on is the decision to not kill Muqtada al-Sadr and allow him to grow his Mahdi Army in defiance of the new Iraqi government. According to Ambassador Bremer, he and the Army were for killing the terrorist leader, but were overruled by the Marine Corps leadership who had responsibility for al-Sadr's neighborhood. Was this general incompetent or merely mistaken?
The most important parts of the book are Peter's attempts to convince readers that al-Qaeda and their ilk truly are Muslim terrorists who actually believe they are fighting a Jihad for Allah. He points out that many westerners, even tough minded intelligence analysts cannot quite wrap their heads around the emotional religious fervor of the enemy.
He is correct that the government in general and the Pentagon in particular has been incompetent when it comes to identifying and analyzing the militant Islamist nature of the enemy. Stories of brave intelligence analysts trying to buck the trend such as Major Coughlin are almost legendary within the defense community.
A followup book that focuses on the Obama administration instead of the Bush administration would be an interesting exercise. One can imagine the biting rebukes the Colonel would have for such recent follies as "man caused disasters", "overseas contingency operations" and more importantly and perhaps tragically the announced timeline/withdrawal date of summer 2011 for large numbers of U.S. forces fighting in Afghanistan.
Wednesday, July 14, 2010
Sunday, July 11, 2010
Send in the Clowns
Along with the reading of the Declaration of Independence, 5k race and fire works the Huntington Beach 4th of July parade is a staple of the day's celebration. Every year the Shriners dazzle children of all ages with their miniature motorcycles and cars and bright carnival costumes that evoke an exotic Arabian past.
The fun of the 4th perhaps obscures the Shriners mission to provide medical care to seriously ill children without means. This missions is similar to the Pentagon's charge to provide short-term and long-term medical care to serving military personnel and veterans. Unlike the Shriners which is a fairly efficient private organization dedicated to a specific purpose, the Pentagon has taken it upon itself to be the healthcare system for the military.
The government's Veterans Administration system made more sense with the massive mobilization of World War Two and the Cold War. Healthcare was a lot cheaper mostly because high technology had not yet come to dominate the field. Now that MRIs and laser surgery are routine healthcare is routinely expensive and increasingly so. The recent passage of President Obama's ruinous health care legislation that seeks to wrestle control of nearly a sixth of the economy is exactly the wrong way to go.
The privatization of the military's healthcare needs, at least the out patient and long term care needs, could have provided a model of an efficient and effective healthcare delivery system. The U.S., for now, has the best medical care in the world so why not get the Pentagon out of the business and foster a relationship with the civilian system that is the envy of the world? A voucher system could go a long way toward accomplishing what the Shriners do everyday for children and we all agree that our veterans are worth the effort.
The fun of the 4th perhaps obscures the Shriners mission to provide medical care to seriously ill children without means. This missions is similar to the Pentagon's charge to provide short-term and long-term medical care to serving military personnel and veterans. Unlike the Shriners which is a fairly efficient private organization dedicated to a specific purpose, the Pentagon has taken it upon itself to be the healthcare system for the military.
The government's Veterans Administration system made more sense with the massive mobilization of World War Two and the Cold War. Healthcare was a lot cheaper mostly because high technology had not yet come to dominate the field. Now that MRIs and laser surgery are routine healthcare is routinely expensive and increasingly so. The recent passage of President Obama's ruinous health care legislation that seeks to wrestle control of nearly a sixth of the economy is exactly the wrong way to go.
The privatization of the military's healthcare needs, at least the out patient and long term care needs, could have provided a model of an efficient and effective healthcare delivery system. The U.S., for now, has the best medical care in the world so why not get the Pentagon out of the business and foster a relationship with the civilian system that is the envy of the world? A voucher system could go a long way toward accomplishing what the Shriners do everyday for children and we all agree that our veterans are worth the effort.
Tuesday, July 6, 2010
Backpack Boot Camp
Boot camp is too precious a time to burden it with anything unnecessary. All drill and ceremony practice should be kept to a minimum. Every waking hour should be orientated toward making young men and women into warriors not simply government workers with weapons. We have been at war since 9/11 and al-Qaeda, Taliban and other militant Islamists show little sign of surrendering.
Boot camp should become the entrance not only into the military, but also to the reality of a war footing. A war footing is not only about producing more weapons and conjuring up deployment schedules. It has to be about a warrior psychology that trains new soldiers to be tough enough to be part of a more effective, more lethal military that honors the unique skills and contributions of combat troops.
Upon arrival at boot camp, along with their running shorts, boots and uniforms the soldiers should be issued their backpacks or rucksacks, rifles and helmets. These should be as much a part of boot camp as running shoes and boots. at formations, during calisthenics and during marches and runs the troops should be wearing their gear. Chin ups, pushups and runs are a whole new ball game with twenty pound packs, helmets and unloaded rifles. But why wait? Isn't more important to produce tough warriors than to produce shiny new soldiers who can march perfectly to the sound of the music?
Boot camp should become the entrance not only into the military, but also to the reality of a war footing. A war footing is not only about producing more weapons and conjuring up deployment schedules. It has to be about a warrior psychology that trains new soldiers to be tough enough to be part of a more effective, more lethal military that honors the unique skills and contributions of combat troops.
Upon arrival at boot camp, along with their running shorts, boots and uniforms the soldiers should be issued their backpacks or rucksacks, rifles and helmets. These should be as much a part of boot camp as running shoes and boots. at formations, during calisthenics and during marches and runs the troops should be wearing their gear. Chin ups, pushups and runs are a whole new ball game with twenty pound packs, helmets and unloaded rifles. But why wait? Isn't more important to produce tough warriors than to produce shiny new soldiers who can march perfectly to the sound of the music?
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
"Defeating Communist Insurgency: the Lesson of Malaya and Vietnam"
"It is a persistently methodical approach and steady pressure which will gradually wear the insurgent down. The government must not allow itself to be diverted either by countermeasures on the part of the insurgent or by the critics on its own side who will be seeking a simpler and quicker solution. There are no short-cuts and no gimmicks." -Sir Robert Thompson, 1966
Friday, June 25, 2010
Win Their Hearts and Minds...By Winning
There seems to be a theory making the rounds in Washington that some how counterinsurgency wars like the one we are fighting in Afghanistan do not require military victory - and in fact military victory as traditionally defined is not possible. At best this notion is a straw man constructed to give cover to government leaders unwilling to do what is necessary to win an ugly, brutal war they say is necessary.
The U.S. Army's experience in the Philippines at the beginning of the 20th century is instructive. After fits and starts the Army adapted to the guerilla's tactics and beat them. It was a brutal, bloody campaign, but the leaders never lost sight of the reality that for a political solution to work the guerillas had to first be defeated. Similarly, the recent military victory of the Sri Lankan government over the Tamil Tigers should be studied very closely by the U.S. More broadly, the British Empire f the 18th, 19th and 20th century was often effective at using soldier-diplomats to impose military solutions that led to political stability.
Recent news reports suggest a deep divide between military and diplomatic leaders concerning Afghanistan that will not help a military or political victory. The Obama administration seems to be calculating it must do enough not to lose and not allow the military to suffer too may casualties before they are eventually pulled out and some sort of "victory" is declared. While everyone agrees there will be no formal signing of a peace treaty with al-Qaeda or the Taliban that does not mean military victory cannot be achieved on the battlefield and should be pursued with all means necessary.
The Afghan people in the cities and in the remote villages in the mountains are doing their own calculus and are trying to decide if it makes more sense to help the Americans who have promised to begin pulling out in a year or side with the Taliban who have vowed to fight until they drive the Americans out of the country. A timeline is no way to win the confidence, trust and active support of the villagers.
An aggressive, sustained offensive with sensible rules of engagement can push the relatively poorly equipped, trained and led enemy to exhaustion. This would be greatly aided if Pakistan will do its part, but if not President Obama may have to convince Pakistan it has no choice, but to let the U.S. military do what must be done regardless of how politically unpopular it would be. With concrete victories on the ground the Afghan hearts and minds will follow.
The U.S. Army's experience in the Philippines at the beginning of the 20th century is instructive. After fits and starts the Army adapted to the guerilla's tactics and beat them. It was a brutal, bloody campaign, but the leaders never lost sight of the reality that for a political solution to work the guerillas had to first be defeated. Similarly, the recent military victory of the Sri Lankan government over the Tamil Tigers should be studied very closely by the U.S. More broadly, the British Empire f the 18th, 19th and 20th century was often effective at using soldier-diplomats to impose military solutions that led to political stability.
Recent news reports suggest a deep divide between military and diplomatic leaders concerning Afghanistan that will not help a military or political victory. The Obama administration seems to be calculating it must do enough not to lose and not allow the military to suffer too may casualties before they are eventually pulled out and some sort of "victory" is declared. While everyone agrees there will be no formal signing of a peace treaty with al-Qaeda or the Taliban that does not mean military victory cannot be achieved on the battlefield and should be pursued with all means necessary.
The Afghan people in the cities and in the remote villages in the mountains are doing their own calculus and are trying to decide if it makes more sense to help the Americans who have promised to begin pulling out in a year or side with the Taliban who have vowed to fight until they drive the Americans out of the country. A timeline is no way to win the confidence, trust and active support of the villagers.
An aggressive, sustained offensive with sensible rules of engagement can push the relatively poorly equipped, trained and led enemy to exhaustion. This would be greatly aided if Pakistan will do its part, but if not President Obama may have to convince Pakistan it has no choice, but to let the U.S. military do what must be done regardless of how politically unpopular it would be. With concrete victories on the ground the Afghan hearts and minds will follow.
Tuesday, June 22, 2010
Hey Buddy Can You Spare a COIN? Misunderstanding Afghanistan
Even before the General McChrystal flap regarding the Rolling Stone magazine article some had the sense that the war in Afghanistan is not going particularly well.
The more serious issue is the COIN strategy currently being implemented in Afghanistan. It is essentially the same as the plan used in Iraq: clear, hold and build. It worked in Iraq for three reasons: first, U.S. troops renewed the offensive in earnest, second, Iraqi forces became a partner and force multiplier and third Iraqi society's relative sophistication made the strategy more workable.
Unfortunately Afghanistan doesn't benefit from the second and third conditions and is not likely to in the near future. Much more so than Iraq Afghanistan is primitive tribal culture that views the indigenous government in Kabul as almost foreign and the coalition forces as alien. Nation-building in terms of road, well and school construction and improved medical care has helped since these programs began under the Bush administration. However, this notion that Kabul, or the U.N. can construct some sort of trickle down civil administration with "government in a box" initiatives.
Afghanistan needs a true, stripped down COIN strategy that finally makes use of Army's counterinsurgency experts-the Special Forces. Instead of being treated as a necessary side show SF should be given the opportunity to take more of a leadership role in the grand strategy for Afghanistan. SF Major Jim Gant wrote a paper called "One Tribe at a Time" that outlined a process by which SF teams would work directly with Afghan villages for periods of time to train the men to fight effectively to protect their village as well as engage in nation-building civic action programs.
Perhaps most importantly, the SF teams would gain the trust of the villagers and provide the kind of intelligence the U.S. needs to help role up the insurgency. According to the Pentagon's counterinsurgency manual, "Effective, accurate and timely intelligence is essential to the conduct of any form of warfare. This maxim applies especially to counterinsurgency operations; the ultimate success or failure of the mission depends on the effectiveness of the intelligence effort."
Maybe General McChrystal's firing can shake up the status quo and provide an opportunity for a course change before its too late.
The more serious issue is the COIN strategy currently being implemented in Afghanistan. It is essentially the same as the plan used in Iraq: clear, hold and build. It worked in Iraq for three reasons: first, U.S. troops renewed the offensive in earnest, second, Iraqi forces became a partner and force multiplier and third Iraqi society's relative sophistication made the strategy more workable.
Unfortunately Afghanistan doesn't benefit from the second and third conditions and is not likely to in the near future. Much more so than Iraq Afghanistan is primitive tribal culture that views the indigenous government in Kabul as almost foreign and the coalition forces as alien. Nation-building in terms of road, well and school construction and improved medical care has helped since these programs began under the Bush administration. However, this notion that Kabul, or the U.N. can construct some sort of trickle down civil administration with "government in a box" initiatives.
Afghanistan needs a true, stripped down COIN strategy that finally makes use of Army's counterinsurgency experts-the Special Forces. Instead of being treated as a necessary side show SF should be given the opportunity to take more of a leadership role in the grand strategy for Afghanistan. SF Major Jim Gant wrote a paper called "One Tribe at a Time" that outlined a process by which SF teams would work directly with Afghan villages for periods of time to train the men to fight effectively to protect their village as well as engage in nation-building civic action programs.
Perhaps most importantly, the SF teams would gain the trust of the villagers and provide the kind of intelligence the U.S. needs to help role up the insurgency. According to the Pentagon's counterinsurgency manual, "Effective, accurate and timely intelligence is essential to the conduct of any form of warfare. This maxim applies especially to counterinsurgency operations; the ultimate success or failure of the mission depends on the effectiveness of the intelligence effort."
Maybe General McChrystal's firing can shake up the status quo and provide an opportunity for a course change before its too late.
Saturday, June 19, 2010
WANTED: Warrior Spirt - some training required, Book Review of "In Search of the Warrior Spirit" by Richard Heckler
Mr. Heckler's book, published in 1990 came out at just the wrong time in history. What incentive did the U.S. Army have as the Cold War melted away, to think seriously about counterinsurgency in general and its Special Forces in particular? From reading the book apparently little indeed.
"In Search of the Warrior Spirit" traces the several months Mr. Heckler and other specialists spent with two Army Special Forces Teams at a post in Massachusetts as part of an experimental program called The Trojan Warrior Project. Heckler, an aikido and meditation expert had mixed feelings about the opportunity from the beginning and his discussions about his reactions to the soldiers and the program are the are intriguing. One of his main issues is the warrior versus killer dichotomy that he finds himself arguing about with his liberal Northern California friends, alternating between complaining about and defending the soldiers.
The project itself, a combination of physical, psychological and spiritual training seems to be a big success based on the data the team has gathered. The Special Forces commanders are pleased and authorize a continuation of the program. Disappointingly, but not unexpectedly, the new commander defunds the program because he thinks its a waste of time. The holistic, big picture approach was too much for many soldiers to get, unfortunately even some in the Special Forces.
More than ever the Army and the Special Forces in particular could benefit from a renewed focus on the warrior spirit.
"In Search of the Warrior Spirit" traces the several months Mr. Heckler and other specialists spent with two Army Special Forces Teams at a post in Massachusetts as part of an experimental program called The Trojan Warrior Project. Heckler, an aikido and meditation expert had mixed feelings about the opportunity from the beginning and his discussions about his reactions to the soldiers and the program are the are intriguing. One of his main issues is the warrior versus killer dichotomy that he finds himself arguing about with his liberal Northern California friends, alternating between complaining about and defending the soldiers.
The project itself, a combination of physical, psychological and spiritual training seems to be a big success based on the data the team has gathered. The Special Forces commanders are pleased and authorize a continuation of the program. Disappointingly, but not unexpectedly, the new commander defunds the program because he thinks its a waste of time. The holistic, big picture approach was too much for many soldiers to get, unfortunately even some in the Special Forces.
More than ever the Army and the Special Forces in particular could benefit from a renewed focus on the warrior spirit.
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